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The initial effect of a marked business recession on state and local
governments would be a decline or a prospective decline in the
yields of state and local taxes. This in turn would necessitate budg-
etary adjustments affecting appropriations, tax rates, borrowing,
the use of accumulated reserves, and other means of financing. The
kind of adjustments made by each individual government would
determine whether in the aggregate state and local governments
made a net contribution toward recovery, whether their influence
on the economy was neutral, or whether they added momentum to
the downward movement.
Whatever the nature of state and local recession adjustments,
their influence on the total economy is likely to be moderate. State
and local purchases of goods and services currently constitute oniy
about 7 per cent of the national aggregate of all purchases of goods
and services. A 20 per cent variation in state and local expenditure,
other factors remaining the same, would, accordingly, change the
gross national product by less than per cent. This relatively
low ratio, however, should not lead us to underrate the importance
of stability in state and local finance. We are dependent upon state
and local governments for vital services whose value cannot be
measured solely by the effects of these services on aggregate de-
mand. Fiscal programs which help to maintain the adequacy of
state and local services in periods of recession are eminently worth-
while for their own sake.
Types of Recession Adjustments
Confronted by an actual or prospective decline in tax yields,
state and local governing bodies may seek to adjust their budgets
to the new fiscal situation by adopting at least one of the following
general policies:
A. They may seek to reduce expenditure by the same amount
that revenue has declined, keeping legal rates of taxation and
utilization of reserves and borrowed funds at pre-recession levels.
B. They may endeavor to maintain their current rate of expendi-
ture. This will require one or more of the following types of action:
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(1) increasing legal rates of taxation or imposing new taxes, (2)
securing additional grants-in-aid, (3) using up accumulated re-
serves more rapidly, and (4) expanding their volume of borrowing.
C. With a view to making a positive contribution toward recovery,
state and local governing bodies may seek to expand expenditure
during the recession. This policy will require more extensive resort
to the types of action called for under policy B above. Taxes will
have to be more steeply raised; additions to grants-in-aid will have
to be more liberal; reserves will have to be drawn down more
rapidly; a still greater expansion of indebtedness will be required.
D. As an alternative or as an additional stimulus to recovery, a
policy of incentive tax reduction may be adopted. This would in-
volve reducing the effective rates of selected taxes below their pre-
recession levels. A policy of incentive tax reduction will require
either drastic cuts in expenditure or types of action identical with
those required to permit an expansion of expenditure, excepting,
of course, tax increases.
It will be noted that all but the first of the four general policies
which have just been outlined are not unique policies but families
of policies. Thus the general policy of maintaining expenditure dur-
ing a recession may be implemented in four different ways: through
taxation, through grants-in-aid, through use of reserves, and through
borrowing. If only one of these expedients is to be employed, four
different choices are offered. If two of them are to be concurrently
employed, there are six different choices; and if three of them
are to be used, there are four different possibilities. A final possi-
bility is that all four expedients may be used together. It should
also be noted that in case more than one of the expedients are used,
the relative degree of reliance placed on each may be varied.
Each of these policies or subpolicies involves one or more basic
types of fiscal action. These are expenditure reduction, tax increases,
increased reliance on reserves, expansion of borrowing, expansion
of expenditure, incentive tax reduction, and additional grants-in-
aid. In order to determine which policy or subpolicy will have
the least favorable and which the most favorable influence on the
general level of economic activity, it is necessary to ascertain the
effect on aggregate demand of each of these basic types of fiscal
action. The individual effects of the fiscal action associated with
each subpolicy must then be added up.
A realistic appraisal of what state and local governments might
do in the event of a recession cannot be limited to the effects of
fiscal adjustments on aggregate demand. Depending on their finan-
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cia! and other circumstances, individual governments are subject
to practical limitations with respect to the types of recession action
they are in. a position to take. What is more to the point, state and
local governments exist primarily to promote the general welfare,
and government actions which may be well adapted to raise the
level of expenditure and employment are not necessarily actions
which will conserve the long-term general welfare.
With the above considerations in mind, we can now proceed to
examine the effects of specific types of fiscal action, each type
being considered in conjunction with the other types of action with
which it is necessarily linked as part of a particular policy.
Expenditure Reduction
Expenditures may be reduced in order to permit an equivalent
amount of tax relief. In a recession, however, it is more likely that
expenditure cuts will be made in order to offset a decline in reve-
nue, in which event nominal rates of taxation may continue un-
changed. Only. this second case will be considered here.
Expenditure reductions which are not passed on to the public in
the form of lower taxes obviously have an adverse effect on ag-
gregate demand. They reduce government purchases of goods and
services with no compensating increase in private purchases. The
net result of such action is to give the economy a further push down-
ward.
It does not follow from the above, however, that efforts to root Out
waste and inefficiency and to eliminate government activities which
have lost their utility should be suspended during a recession. A
business downturn generally brings new needs for public assistance.
Savings resulting from improved efficiency may be used to meet
these needs. They may also be used to remedy deficiencies in other
facilities and services vital to the general welfare. Alternatively,
the, savings may be passed on to the public in lower taxes. In all of
these cases the effect on aggregate demand will be neutral and the
general welfare will be enhanced.
Aside from their unfavorable effect on aggregate demand, ex-
penditure cuts which lower standards of public service or which
result in a deterioration of public facilities have other untoward
consequences. To the extent that the cuts are applied to services
and facilities necessary to business operations, the task of recovery
is rendered more difficult. To the extent that support of public
education is reduced, irreparable damage may be done to the youth
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who are unfortunate enough to be of school age at the time the
recession occurs. A cut in health and welfare services is likely to
aggravate the unrest and discontent which is the normal accom-
paniment of a recession. In short, as a method of adjusting to a
business decline, expenditure reductions without offsetting tax re-
ductions should be avoided, if at all possible.
Tax Increases
There are two distinct recession policies under which the expedient
of increasing legal rates of taxation or of adding new taxes might be
employed. Under the first policy an increase in tax revenue would
be sought in order to finance an equivalent expansion of expendi-
ture. Under the second and more likely policy, taxes would be
raised in order to offset a recession-induced decline in revenue and
to maintain rates of expenditure at their former levels.
Under the first policy the effect of a tax increase on aggregate
demand is apparently neutral. The tax increase will probably re-
duce private purchases of goods and services by at least as much
as government expenditures are increased. Certain other aspects of
this policy will be considered below.
The effect of the second policy on aggregate demand is definitely
adverse. When a government increases itscollections from the
public merely to maintain its preexisting level of expenditure, it
reduces aggregate demand. It diminishes the amount of purchasing
power available for personal consumption and private investment
with no compensating increase in its own purchases of goods and
services. This result does not, of course, follow where the new
revenue collections represent private funds that would not other-
wise be used. This exceptional case may be dismissed as far as most
state and local governments are concerned. The limited tax sources
at their disposal bear down heavily on the income and expenditure
of the lower and middle income groups, who are not likely to have
idle funds.
Under recession conditions an upward adjustment of taxes not
only tends further to reduce the gross national product, but it has
an unfavorable impact on business incentives, creating uncertain-
ties which slow up the process of recovery. Tax increases during a
business downturn are unquestionably badly timed, but unless state
and local governments have previously followed long-run budget
policies which have taken into consideration the contingency of a
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recession, such increases may represent the only way of financing
high-priority services.
Stabilization Reserves
Governments can accumulate reserves only by spending less
than they receive. The size of their reserves, if any, at the beginning
of a recession will therefore depend upon their past budgetary
policies. To the extent that they have any reserves when a reces-
sion hits them, such reserves may, under -theappropriate condi-
tions, be used to implement three different objectives: to maintain
expenditures at current levels without increasing taxes, to permit
a temporary expansion of expenditures without a tax rise, arid to
permit a temporary reduction of taxes without cutting expenditures.
When reserves are used to fill in the gap resulting from a revenue
decline and to maintain expenditures at current levels without in-
creasing tax rates, the effect on aggregate demand is neutral. Gov-
ernment purchases of goods and services remain as they were be-
fore and, since tax rates continue the same, private purchases of
goods and services are likewise unaffected. In this case the reserves
perform a protective function. They make it unnecessary to give
the economy an additional downward thrust through expenditure
cuts or tax increases.
When reserves are used to finance a temporary expansion of ex-
penditure, the economy is given an upward boost. Government
purchases of goods and services are increased with no offsetting re-
ductions in private purchases. There are, however, certain limita-
tions on the use of reserves to finance an expenditure increase.
Expansion of Borrowing
Private demand for loanable funds usually shrinks during a reces-
sion, and in this situation an expansion of public borrowing is not
likely to reduce the volume of private purchases financed on a
credit basis. In the recession programs of state and local govern-
ments, increased borrowing may therefore have the same effect on
aggregate demand as the use of reserves. When a government in-
creases its borrowings in order to maintain its current rate of ex-
penditure without raising its taxes, the effect on aggregate demand
is neutral. When it borrows to finance an expansion of expenditure,
it makes a positive contribution to aggregate demand.
179STATE AND LOCAL FINANtE
For practical reasons, borrowing is likely to have a more im-
portant role in state and local recession adjustments than that of
reserves. Many governments with no reserves have unused bor-
rowing capacity. Even in the case of the most thrifty governments,
reserves are relatively small compared with borrowing potential.
But borrowing involves a future cost in interest and amortization
charges. Moreover, there are restrictions of various kinds on the pur-
poses and amounts of government borrowing.
Although government spending of borrowed funds during a reces-
sion is conducive to employment stability, this does not justify bor-
rowing for any and all purposes. Borrowing to defray current op-
erating expenses and current charges is undesirable under any cir-
cumstances, since it means that future taxpayers will be saddled
with debt service charges for which they will receive no compen-
sating benefits. Borrowing should as far as possible be restricted
to the financing of durable capital facilities which will yield worth-
while services to the public during the period •in which the ap-
plicable debt charges are being met. Even in this case, however,
the fact that a project would be useful and that its construction
would provide employment does not constitute sufficient justifica-
tion for borrowing.
Bond-financed projects must meet the same budgetary tests as
tax-supported activities, since bond projects will ultimately have
to be paid for through taxation or some other form of revenue. The
significant questions are: Is the need for the project as urgent as
the need for other projects? Will the benefits which the project
yields to the public be worth their cost in debt service charges? and
Has the public the ability and the willingness to pay the applicable
charges over the indicated span of years? Projects which meet the
above tests cannot be dreamed up overnight. It is only through the
advance preparation of a long-term capital budget that a sound
selection can be made.
It goes without saying that bond issues should never exceed the
reasonable life expectancy of the improvements they are intended
to finance. Otherwise taxpayers may find themselves paying debt
service charges on dead horses. To save interest cost, moreover,
governments should in normal years finance at least the annually
recurring part of their capital expenditure from current revenue. Bor-
rowing should in general be used to finance the peaks in the long-term
capital budget and to maintain capital expenditures at their
programed amount during a period of recession and revenue de-
dine.
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Stepping Up Expenditure.
The case for increasing government expenditure during a reces-
Sian centers around the premise that, as private demand recedes,
governments must expand their purchases of goods and services to
help fill in the gap. Ruling out the possibility of federal aid, the
funds for a stepped-up program of expenditure can be• obtained in
only two ways: by heavier taxation or by recourse to reserves and
borrowing. As has already been pointed out, higher taxes are likely
to curtail private demand still further and will in addition have un-
favorable effects on business incentives. .
Ifthe stepped-up expenditure program is financed by means of
reserves and borrowing, its wisdom would appear to depend on the
purpose for which the new funds are spent. To supply a more càstly
program of current services during recession years than taxpayers
have the ability and willingness to pay for in normal years is ob-
viously to invite future trouble. Under any circumstances borrow-
ing to finance current expenditure is unwise.
A good case may be made for a stepped-up, bond-financed pro-
gram of expenditure for capital outlays, all of the projects
included meet the budgetary tests previously set forth. A govern-
ment which has a master plan of development based on adequate
surveys, which has a shelf or reserve of needed public works con-
forming to the master plan, and which follows the procedures of,
long-range budgeting should be in a safe position to advance the.
construction dates of certain projects, if a decline in construction
costs or other developments during a recession should make such a
change worthwhile. Under these circumstances a stepped-up con-
struction program not only would contribute toward employment
stability but would save the taxpayers money.
Incentive Tax Reduction
Proposals to 'reduce taxes during a recession are commonly based
on the assumption that tax reduction will increase personal con-
sumption and private investment expenditure, thus expanding em-
ployment. This result can hardly be expected to Occur when tax re-
duction is accomplished by cuts in government appropriations. In
that event it would seem highly probable that the ensuing decline
in government purchases of goods and services would fully cancel
the increase in private expenditure. Indeed, to the extent that any
part of the tax relief given is not used for consumption or invest-
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ment but is retained by its recipients in the form of idle cash, the
net result of tax reduction based on budget cuts would be a net de-
cline in aggregate. employment..
When funds needed for tax reduction, are obtained by borrow-
ing or through the use of accumulated surplus, it is still a moot ques-
tion whether larger and prompter effects on employment might not
be obtained by government expenditure of these funds on a
stepped-up program of public works. There is, of course, the possi-
bility that tax reduction would so encourage taxpayers as to lead
them to increase private expenditure by more than the amount of
their tax relief. The odds for and against this eventuality are, how-
ever, not determinable.
Assuming that a government has adopted the proper rates of
taxation for a normal or average year, any reduction from this level
financed by mean of surpluses or by borrowing must necessarily be
temporary. As soon as the emergency is over, rates will have to be
restored to their normal level. Where tax relief has been based on
borrowing, the new normal level of rates will, in fact, have to be
somewhat higher than the original normal rates in order to take
care of debt service charges on an unproductive addition to the
public debt. It is more difficult to raise taxes than it is to reduce
them; and' at least so far as state and local governments are con-
cerned, temporary tax reduction for the sole purpose of stimulat-
ing employment would not seem to be worth the risks and costs in-
volved.
Additional Federal Aid
The effect on aggregate demand of extending additional federal
aid to state and local governments during a recession depends al-
most entirely on how the federal government obtains the funds re-
quired for this purpose and on the disposition which state and local
governments make of them. If the federal government obtains the
requisite funds by reducing its own expenditures, and if the states
and localitiesusetheiradditional aid merely tooffsettheir
recession-induced., revenue losses, maintaining their purchases of
goods .and services at former levels, the net result is to reduce ag-
gregate demand. If states and localities use the federal aid to ex-
pand their expenditure, the net effect on aggregate demand is
neutral. The only change is the replacement of a given amount of
federal expenditure by a like amount of state and local expenditure.
The effects are substantially the same when the federal govern-
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ment obtains its funds through new or higher taxes. In this event,
private purchases of goods and services are reduced and, if state
and local governments employ the new aid solely to maintain their
current levels of expenditure, aggregate demand will be reduced.
If the tax-financed aid is used to expand state and local expenditure,
the effect on aggregate demand will be neutral, but a certain amount
of state and local expenditure will now have been substituted for a
like amount of private expenditure.
It is only when the federal government obtains its funds through
deficit financing that federal aid is capable of exercising a sustain-
ing influence on the economy. When funds so obtained are em-
ployed by the states and localities to maintain pre-recession levels
of expenditure, the effect on aggregate demand is neutral, but state
and local tax increases and expenditure cuts which would have re-
duced aggregate demand may thereby have been averted. When
aid based on borrowed funds is used to expand state and local ex-
penditure, aggregate demand receives a net addition.
If consideration is limited to the effect on aggregate demand, it
would appear to be a matter of indifference whether borrowing
for state and local purposes is performed by the federal government
or by the governments most directly concerned. From the stand-
point of political philosophy, however, the difference is important.
Those who believe that state and local governments should preserve
a maximum degree of independence in matters not directly affect-
ing the national interest will prefer state and local borrowing. This
raises a practical question which is reserved for later consideration.
Under the conditions which now govern the marketing of state and
local securities, will state and local governments be able to expand
their borrowings during a recession to the degree needed to enable
them to maintain and perhaps to expand their total expenditure?
Requisites for Stability
The preceding analysis indicates that the two most common ways
of adjusting state and local budgets to a recession—expenditure cuts
and tax increases—are likely to exert a depressing influence on the
economy. In the face of declining tax yields, the only way in which
state and local governments can maintain or expand their expendi-
tures without adverse effects on aggregate demand is by more ex-
tensive reliance on reserves and borrowing. Since it is probable that
reserves will be small, reliance must rest mainly on an expansion of
borrowing. Incentive tax reduction and additional federal aid must
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also be based on borrowing, if they are to accomplish their in-
tended purpose.
But borrowing is subject to limitations. In the case of state and
local governments, it is not desirable to borrow to defray current
expenses, current charges, and current obligations. With a few pos-
sible exceptions, borrowing should be restricted to the financing of
durable capital facilities. This additional restriction complicates the
problem of budgetary adjustment. During a recession, state and lo-
cal governments must avoid expenditure cuts and tax increases;
they must maintain or expand their total expenditure by increased
borrowing; but they must not increase their long-term indebtedness
for purely current purposes.
To satisfy all of the above conditions simultaneously, a govern-
ment must either possess unusually ample reserves or approach a
recession with revenue receipts substantially in excess of current
expenditure needs. A partial pay-as-you-go plan for financing capi-
tal projects offers a rational method of providing both the required
revenue excess and an expansion of borrowing for capital outlays
during a recession.
A partial pay-as-you-go plan means that revenue in a normal
nonrecession year must be large enough to cover not only all ex-
penditure on current account but a sizable proportion of capital
expenditure as well. Where a plan of this kind has been followed,
revenue normally used to finance capital outlays may be shifted
to the support of current activities when a recession occurs. Cur-
rent expenditures may thus be maintained at pre-recession levels
without necessitating a rise in taxes. If the proper advance prepara-
tions have been made, a stepped-up program of capital construction
may be financed on the basis of expanded borrowing.
0
ThePresent Situation
The main defenses of state and local governments against a re-
cession would appear to be: a substantial margin of revenue which
is presently being utilized for capital outlays but which might be
shifted to the support of current services should the necessity arise;
accumulated reserves; and the capacity to expand borrowing as
needed to maintain or to increase the pre-recession volume of capi-
tal construction. These defenses must, for the most part, be built up
in times of high prosperity. To attempt to provide a revenue sur-
plus and to accumulate reserves after a recession has arrived would
obviously be self-defeating.
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This leads us to inquire into the present state of. our defenses. To
what extent are state and local governments now financing their
capital outlays on a pay-as-you-go basis? How much of the revenue
so used could be shifted to the support of current serviôes should the
need arise? What is the present size of state and local reserves and
what restrictions, if any, would apply to their spending? Are there
any impediments which would limit or slow up an expansion of
state and local borrowing during a recession? Finally, what can
state and local governments do in the period immediately ahead to
strengthen their recession defenses?
For answers to these questions we must rely mainly on the an-
nual compilations of the Governments Division of the Bureau of the
Census, which cover only state governments and governments of
cities with populations of 25,000 or more. These units of govern-
ment originally receive about 70 per cent of all state and local reve-
nue. The latest period for which published data are at hand is the
fiscal year which ended in 1952. Unsatisfactory as these data are,
they yield important information.
Revenue
At first glance, the revenue situation of state governments ap-
pears fairly bright. Excluding the receipts of insurance trust funds,
aggregate state revenue from all sources reached a total of $14.4
billion in 1952. Expenditures for current purposes—including cur-
rent operation, assistance and subsidies, payments to other govern-
ments, interest, debt redemption, and contributions to employee
retirement funds—came to a total of $12.5 billion. This left a margin
of $1.8 billion, or 13 per cent of total revenue, available for capital
outlays and increase of reserves. The relative size of the revenue
margin varied, of course, from state to state. Thus it was over 20
per cent of total revenue in Minnesota and Texas but less than 6 per
cent in New York and Pennsylvania.
When .these revenue margins are further analyzed, however, it
becomes apparent that they are attributable almost entirely to the
operations of state highway funds. For all of the states combined,
highway revenues exceeded highway expenditures exclusive of capi-
tal outlays by nearly $1.6 billion in 1952. This indicates an average
revenue margin of only 2 per cent for all other state funds. In not
a few states general fund revenue in 1952 was barely sufficient to
cover current expenditure needs. Unless these states find it possible
to shift some of their highway revenue to the support of other
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tions, they will be obliged to make expenditure cuts or to raise taxes
in the event of a recession.
In only four states—Delaware, Georgia, New York and Rhode
Island—are gasoline tax revenues covered into the general fund.
In all other states they are dedicated to specific purposes or segre-
gated in special funds. The Hayden-Cartwright Act of 1934, more-
over, imposes a penalty with respect to the allocation of federal
highway aid on states that divert highway-user imposts to nonhigh-
way uses.
In the 481 cities with populations of 25,000 or over, the revenue
situation in 1952 was as follows: Total revenue, excluding the re-
ceipts of insurance trust funds, amounted to $6.4 billion. Total ex-
penditures, excluding capital outlays, totaled $5.8 billion. The reve-
nue margin available for capital outlays or increase of reserves was
therefore $600 million, or about 9 per cent of total revenue.
The ratios for individual cities, however, showed a wide range of
divergence. On the basis of the method of calculation used for the
present purpose, which does not take into account amounts drawn
from reserves, Philadelphia had an indicated revenue deficit. New
York City had a revenue margin of less than 3 per cent. Los Angeles
and Charlotte, North Carolina, on the other hand, had revenue mar-
gins in excess of 20 per cent. We are thus obliged to conclude that
unless some of the cities increase their present revenue margins,
they will be forced either to reduce their expenditure or to impose
additional taxes in the event of a recession.
Reserves
The total cash and security holdings of all state governments,
excluding offsets to long-term debt and the holdings of insurance
trust funds, amounted to approximately $7.7 billion at the end of
the fiscal year 1952. This was equivalent to about 53 per cent of
the aggregate of all state revenue for that year. A quick look at in-
dividual states shows Minnesota with cash and security holdings
equivalent to 125 per cent of its revenue; California with the equiva-
lent of 76 per cent; and Pennsylvania and New York with hold-
ings representing about 30 per cent of total revenue.
The available statistics give no clue of the extent to which these
liquid assets would be available for the support of current services
in the event of a revenue decline. There is evidence, however, that
at least a fifth of the assets in question belong to highway funds.
Another substantial fraction probably represents the proceeds of
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bond issues pledged for specific nonhighway construction projects.
Still another fraction presumably represents past revenue surpluses
which have already been appropriated and against which com-
mitments for construction have already been made.
The 481 cities with populations of 25,000 or over had cash and
security holdings to the amount of $2.5 billion at the end of the
fiscal year 1952. This amount does not, of course, include offsets to
long-term debt and the assets of insurance trust funds. For all
cities combined, the average ratio of liquid assets to revenue was
39 per cent. In the case of Philadelphia, however, such assets repre-
sented 67 per cent of revenue, whereas in the case of New York
City they represented only 17 per cent. As in the case of similar
liquid reserves held by the states, there is no way of ascertaining
from the census statistics the extent to which these reserves are
already subject to commitments, or the extent to which they repre-
sent minimum requirements for working capital.
Borrowing Power
The capacity of state and local governments to expand their bor-
rowing is undoubtedly greater at the present time than it was in
the 1920's and early 1930's. Striking evidence of this is furnished by
the lower ratio of interest costs to total revenue. In 1929 the ag-
gregate interest payments of all state and local governments repre-
sented about 10 per cent of their total revenue. In 1952, despite an
80 per cent increase in state and local indebtedness, interest pay-
ments represented less than 3 per cent of total revenue.1
But serious obstacles to the prompt expansion of state and local
indebtedness in the event of a recession still exist. In most of the
states the incurring of debt by state and local governments is sub-
ject to both constitutional and statutory restrictions. The constitu-
tions of a few states forbid their state governments to contract any
debt for any purpose whatsoever. In other states an affirmative
referendum vote is required to legalize a bond issue. A common
form of statutory restriction limits local indebtedness to a specified
percentage of the total assessed value of the taxable property
within the local jurisdiction.
The above obstacles are not necessarily insurmountable. Bond
elections may be held to authorize bonds which are not to be is-
sued immediately. Given time, statutory debt limits may be liber-
1Suweyof Current Dept. of Commerce, National Income and Product
Series, Tables 8 and 9.
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alized through legislative enactments. If this is not considered de-
sirable, assessment ratios and assessed valuations may be raised.
Debt limitations commonly apply only to so-called "full faith and
credit debt," i.e. obligations for which the credit of the issuing gov-
ernmentisunconditionally pledged. Nonguaranteed securities
which do not carry the full faith and credit pledge are generally
exempt from legal debt limitations. The most common type of non-
guaranteed obligation is the so-called revenue bond. The volume of
revenue bonds outstanding has been growing rapidly. Last year
they accounted for approximately a third of all new state and local
long-term issues.
The so-called "government authority," which usually issues only
revenue bonds, represents a convenient device for circumventing
both exhausted debt limits and constitutional restrictions on bor-
rowing. The New York—New Jersey Port Authority is an institution
of long standing. There are now scores of toll highway and bridge
authorities. School building authorities are now functioning in Penn-
sylvania, Georgia, and Maine. School buildings are leased to local
jurisdictions and the bond issues of the authorities are secured by
leasehold rental payments financed from local appropriations.
Another obstacle which might prevent state and local govern-
ments from expanding their borrowing to the required degree dur-
ing a recession is the fact that small units of government issuing
securities in small volume and at rare intervals are at a disadvantage
in selling their bonds. The states and larger cities ordinarjly find
a ready market for their securities, but smaller units of government
are frequently forced to rely exclusively on their local banks and
local capitalists. When they attempt to tap the national capital
market, they are penalized by higher interest rates which may or
may not accord with their actual financial condition.
One way of improving the credit position of the small government
unit is the marketing of all local securities through a central state
agency. This method has been successfully employed in North Caro-
lina for the last two decades. All local governments in the state
must secure the approval of the North Carolina Local Government
Commission in order to borrow for any purpose whatever. As a
prior condition to its approval, the Commission requires the sub-
mission of financial and economic data bearing on the ability of the
petitioning government to service the proposed new debt. Cen-
tralized marketing permits the Commission to consolidate small
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bond issues into blocks large enough to interest the more impor-
tant national underwriting groups. The Commission's knowledge of
the sources of investment funds, both within and without the state,
has resulted in a marked reduction in interest costs for the smaller
units of government.
State loans to counties and school districts, from funds secured
through the sale of state bonds, represent another way of solving
the credit problem of the small political unit. The state of California
recently put into effect a $485 million program of state capital out-
lay loans to local school districts. This program was financed by
bonds secured by the full faith and credit of the state government.
A similar program financed through the sale of state bonds was
adopted by the state of Washington. Under the Washington plan,
state loans to local school districts for capital outlays are repayable
within a period of ten years, circumstances permitting. Instead of
loans, a number of states, including Delaware, Maryland, North
Carolina, and South Carolina, are making grants-in-aid to local
jurisdictions for school construction, the funds for this purpose be-
ing obtained through the sale of state bonds.
A final doubt concerning the capacity of state and local govern-
ments to expand their borrowing during a recession relates to the
ability and willingness of investors to purchase an expanded volume
of security issues on reasonable terms. However, state and local
governments are in a better position than they have ever been be-
fore to purchase a large share of their own issues. State and local
governments now hold $12.5 billion worth of federal securities in
their various trust funds and reserves. Assuming that the Federal
Reserve System will support the market for federal securities, state
and local governments should be able to substitute their own new
issues for a portion of their federal holdings if necessary.
State and local employee retirement funds now have assets in ex-
cess of $6 billion and their reserves are growing at the rate of
$700 million per year. These funds furnish a market for state and
local bonds which, if need be, could be extended. The Controller
of New York State recently purchased, at yields below the current
market rate, ten bond issues of rural school districts, amounting to
$20 million, as investments for public employee pension funds. Simi-
larly, in Pennsylvania, the state School Building Authority placed
over $16 million of 3 per cent school revenue bonds directly with
state pension funds.
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For Action Now
The best time to prepare for a recession is a period of rising
prosperity, but there are certain steps, which state and local govern-
ments can take at any time to strengthen their recession defenses.
These steps may be summarized as follows:
PARTIALPAY-AS-YOU-GO
1. As a means of stabilizing their current services and of avoid-
ing expenditure cuts and tax increases during a recession, state and
local governments should seek to place themselves on a partial
pay-as-you-go basis with respect to the financing of capital out-
lays during nonrecession years.
2. In a period of ebonomic uncertainty, governments should strive
to secure the revenue margin necessary for the above purpose
through the elimination of waste and inefficiency. The resulting sav-
ings should not be allowed to ,reduce total expenditure but should
be used to finance new and needed additions to the capital con-
struction program.
3. State governments should consider ways and means of tempo-
rarily shifting to the support of current government services a por-
tion of the highway revenue now used for construction purposes
as a means of averting expenditure cuts and tax increases during a
recession. An expanded bond-financed program of highway con-
struction and the assumption by state general funds of amounts of
highway indebtedness equal to the amounts of highway revenue
diverted should meet the requirements of the Hayden-Cartwright
Act.
RESERVES
4. State and local governments with accumulated revenue sur-
pluses appropriated but not as yet spent for construction projects
should consider the advisability of financing a portion of such
projects through bond issues in order to create reserves which could
support current services during a recession.
BORROWING
5. The states and localities should prepare shelves or reservoirs
of needed public works scheduled in order of urgency with a suffi-
cient number of projects in the blueprint stage to permit a prompt
expansion of construction work should that become desirable.
6. State and local governments should ascertain now what ob-
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stacles, if any, would prevent or slow down an expansion of their
borrowing during a recession and should make appropriate ad-
vance preparations to remove or to circumvent them. Whether such
preparations call for the advance approval of bond issues, the liber-
alization of obsolete debt limitations, the creation of authorities, or
other measures, will depend on the circumstances of each case.
7. State governments should develop plans to assist local gov-
ernments in maintaining or expanding their construction programs
during a recession. In this connection they should consider such
devices as the marketing of local bonds through central state agen-
cies, the purchase of local securities by public employee retirement
funds, state guarantees of local bond issues, and state loans or grants
for local construction financed on the basis of state bond issues.
COMMENT
C. HARRY KAHN, National Bureau of Economic Research
I cannot entirely agree with Heer's appraisal of the importance
of the state-local sector in a prospective downturn of economic ac-
tivity. It is true that state-local expenditures for goods and services
constitute at present only 7 per cent of the gross national product.
However, their importance may also be measured in relation to such
strategic variables as gross private domestic investment and federal
government expenditures for other than national security purposes.
State-local expenditures, measured in GNP terms, are one-half as
large as gross private investment and three times as large as federal
civil expenditures. They may thus be significant in offsetting a de-
cline in private investment, and they certainly constitute a larger
base for possible government action to combat depression than do
comparable federal expenditures (obviously, civil rather than de-
fense expenditures best lend themselves to this purpose)Ido
not intend to suggest that state-local governments are well suited
and likely to engage in such countercydical action. But if the an-
swer is in the negative it is likely to be for reasons other than their
aggregative importance relative to the rest of the economy.
In his discussion of various types of budgetary adjustment to a
decline in economic activity, Heer states that an expenditure cut
1ThePresident's Economic Report indeed indicates as much in stating that
"if it should become necessary, outlays for federal public works could be stepped
up by one-half or more within a year. State and local outlays, which are now the
highest on record, might be expanded to a similar extent if financial arrange-
ments were adequate." Economic Report of the President, January 1954, p. 103.
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balanced by an equivalent tax cut "will be neutral" in its effect on
aggregate demand, and he similarly concludes that when coupled
with an expenditure increase "the effect of a tax increase on ag-
gregate demand is apparently neutral." He then goes on to discuss
the case in which tax rates would be raised in order to "offset a
recession-induced decline in revenue and to maintain rates of ex-
pencliture at their former levels." For this third—and I think very
relevant—case Heer believes the effect on aggregate demand "is
definitely adverse." If, as Heer says, a balanced tax and expenditure
cut has a neutral effect, why should the maintenance of a given
level of tax collections and expenditures have an adverse effect?
My reaction to these three cases is that, from a purely analytical
point of view, only situations in which expenditures for current
output and taxes are maintained can be considered neutral. The
balanced increase may be considered expansionary, the balanced
decrease contradictory.
Part of the difficulty of Heer's position appears to be due to his
failure to distinguish clearly between tax rates and tax collections.
This becomes particularly noticeable in his discussion of stabiliza-
tion reserves. Here it is stated that "When reserves are used to fill
in the gap resulting from a revenue decline and to maintain ex-
penditures at current levels without increasing tax rates, the effect
on aggregate demand is neutral." It is true that tax rates in this
model remain the same, but tax collections obviously do not. Hence
filling the gap by means of a stabilization reserve fund leads to
the same approximate result as an automatically induced deficit
and should be considered as expansionary in its effect on aggregate
demand. However, in his discussion of expansion of borrowing Heer
again concludes that "When a government increases its borrowings
in order to maintain its current rate of expenditure without raising
its taxes, the effect on aggregate demand is neutral." In the discus-
sion on additional federal aid the interpretation of the effects on
aggregate demand is in several similar cases at variance with that
indicated above.
Heer also deals with the question of the extent to which borrow-
ing may be used as a means of state-local recession adjustment. He
says that in times of tight budgets it is advisable to channel cur-
rent revenues into operating funds and to restrict borrowing to
durable capital facilities. As a general, long-run maxim this may
be a good rule to guide policy. But when the kinds of recession
situations that may develop in the state-local area are considered
it seems to me unnecessarily stringent. It is entirely possible that
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because of the rise in recession-type expenditures to be made out
of state-local general funds, outlays for current needs will largely
replace expenditures for capital improvements. Capital outlays may,
and probably will, continue to be made by user-financed special
purpose funds and authorities whose revenues usually are cyclically
stable and whose reserves often are large. It is the expenditures, de-
pendent on general fund revenues, such as sales, excise, income,
and property taxes, that are exposed to the greatest amount of in-
stability. Usually these expenditures are for administrative, welfare,
and school purposes. Heer states that "Borrowing to defray current
operating expenses and current charges is undesirable under any
circumstances, since it means that future taxpayers will be saddled
with debt service charges for which they will receive no compen-
sating benefits." It is my impression that he is here emphasizing a
general principle of private and governmental finance under ordi-
nary circumstances. I would prefer to ask: How much of state-local
expenditures can, if necessary, be temporarily financed through
borrowing and paid off in later years of prosperity? This is in effect
a stabilization reserve plan in reverse. The objection that future
taxpayers would be saddled with charges for which they receive no
compensating benefits may also be made against a reserve fund,
only again in reverse.
On th.e factual level, I fully share Heer's skepticism as to the size
of available reserve funds and the probable need to rely heavily
on borrowing to close revenue-expenditure gaps. As he indicated,
the census statistics on cash and security holdings of state-local
governments are difficult to evaluate without information as to
what type of funds hold them and how much of the holdings con-
stitute unspent proceeds of recent bond issues and minimum work-
ing balances. My own scant information suggests that bona fide re-
serves, which are available for stabilization purposes, are consider-
ably smaller in amount than the census figure of $15.5 billion of
cash and security holdings (excluding offsets to long-term debt and
trust funds). For instance, reserves currently available for New
York City's executive budget amount to a mere $32 million.2 The
census reports New York City's liquid assets as $288 million. It
seems doubtful that the difference can be accounted for by semi-
autonomous bodies and special purpose units whose budgets are
outside the Mayor's. A quick glance at the figures for some state
2Strictlyspeaking, New York City, like many other cities, is at present not per-
mitted by state law to build up any general fund reserves against depression
contingencies.
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executive budgets, such as those of New York, New Jersey, and
Wisconsin, also indicates that reserve funds are considerably lower
than what might be inferred from liquid assets figures. These
budgets indicate that reserve funds, on the average, amount to 12
per cent of general fund revenues. This admittedly crude evidence
leads me to suggest that an estimate of about $8 billion for all state-
local reserve funds would be more accurate than the liquid assets
figure of $15.5 billion.
This would indeed still constitute a sizable amount of reserves,
and its significance is marred only by the fact that an aggregate
for state-local governments cannot be interpreted in the same fash-
ion as if it stood for a single governmental unit such as the federal
government. The probability that these reserves are unevenly dis-
tributed means that some governmental units will have more than
the amount of reserves required to fill a prospective expenditure-
revenue gap whereas others may have practically none. In conse-
quence these reserves are not strictly additive.
I agree with Heer's analysis of the states' and localities' aggregate
borrowing power, and conclude from it that the outlook here is
much more sanguine than in the case of reserves. It is generally
held that states and localities could sell several billion dollars'
worth of additional bonds without appreciably affecting the yield
rates on such issues. This expectation is based on the following
facts: (1) present interest costs are still low, on the basis of histori-
cal comparison, relative to revenues of state-local governments and
relative to national income; (2) state and local governments hold
billions of dollars' worth of federal securities in various trust ac-
counts which could be exchanged for their own securities; and (3)
the bonds of most states are rated Aaa or Aa by Moody's Manual
of Investments. Serious obstacles to a prompt expansion of debt
on a large scale, as has been pointed out, exist primarily on the sup-
ply rather than the demand side. Constitutional prohibitions and
limitations as well as requirements for time-consuming referenda
may force some projects to be postponed by time periods ranging
from several months to a few years.
•This delay in the issuance of new debt is not as serious as it ap-
pears at first sight. The major tax revenue of local governments, the
property tax,8 is relatively stable over cycles and experience has
Comprehensive data on the tax revenues of state and local governments in
eleven eastern and middle western states show that of the total of such revenue
the amount derived from property taxes varies from 43 per cent in Michigan
(fiscal 1952) to 67 per cent in New Jersey (fiscal 1949).
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shown that collections from this source decline with a time lag of one
and sometimes. even two years, so that tax revenues may hold up
fairly well until proceeds from new debt issues become available.
The problem is a little more serious for the general funds of state
governments, whose major revenue sources are frequently sales and
income taxes, which are relatively sensitive to cycles. Much of the
difficulty that state budgets face in recession is caused by the segre-
gation of major operating funds and the earmarking of revenues.
Some state activities are thereby well insulated against economic
adversity whereas others bear the full brunt of it. The fact that the
total of state and local tax revenues is not very cycle-sensitive loses
thereby much of its value, if it has any.
As Heer points out, highway revenues, the most important stable
element among state taxes, are almost universally segregated. He
suggests that consideration be given to shifting temporarily a portion
of highway revenues to the support of current government services
(as was indeed the practice in the thirties before earmarking be-
came a common device). Heer seems to hold that the federal Hayden-
Cartwright Act of 1934 against the diversion of highway revenues
might be an obstacle here. Yet the Hayden-Cartwright Act has not
been a significant cause of the present state of affairs. The main dif-
ficulty lies at the state level, where there has been a lack of budg-
etary comprehensiveness. The chopping up of budgets prevents
flexibility in budget making and tends to destabilize what might
otherwise be a stable The states have revenues which are
relatively insensitive to business fluctuations when viewed in the ag-
gregate. There will of course still be some falling off of revenues
with a decline in income, but an equally troublesome source of
budgetary instability is the effort, primarily self-imposed, to cir-
cumscribe the free use of available funds and borrowing power by
various legal prohibitions.5
The usual justification for stable revenues at the state-local level
is the stabilization of expenditures which might otherwise have to
This should not be construed as an argument against highway construction
and maintenance in times of depression. On the contrary, little would be gained
if by filling in one gap we merely created a new one. The great need for addi-
tional modern roads which is at present perceived throughout the nation consti-
tutes a convenient antidepression weapon. The above argument does not concern
highways as such but rather is aimed at budgetary rigidity.
Replies to a questionnaire circulated by the Council of State Governments
in 1948 showed that of the twenty-six state governments which stated their an-
swer in quantitative form, sixteen, or almost two-thirds, found that over one-half
of their revenue was earmarked. However, the two most important states—New
York and California—are not included in this sample.
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be reduced. If the stabilization of expenditures is prevented by de-
vices such as the segregation of revenues into earmarked funds, one
more justification for the type of revenUe structure that states and
localities now have becomes greatly weakened.
MELVIN I. Wmm, Brooklyn College
Federal expenditure and revenue reactions automatically induced
by a decline in aggregate income are usually considered a first line
of defense against economic recession. The task of quantitative
analysis, then, is to evaluate the stabilizing contributions of these
reactions—applying the concept of built-in flexibility. It can be as-
sumed that the federal government would hardly dare cut its au-
tonomous expenditures—at least not in deliberate response to the
forces of deflation. And since it would likewise not raise tax rates,
built-in flexibility can be counted on as a minimal contribution to
stability.
Why nOt a similar approach to state and local finance—that is,
initial concentration on built-in flexibility before use of other
policies? If all state and local governments followed a coordinated
policy—with direction as well as assistance from the federal gov-
ernment—it might be possible for them to assume a share of the
responsibility for controlling fluctuations. But most state or local
governments are obliged to act more or less autonomously with
limited financial resources and in the economic interest of the area
they serve. Under these circumstances it is impossible for them to
contribute much to the control of economic fluctuations. Rather it
is their responsibility to seek an optimal adaptation to the fluctua-
tions that occur. Any contribution they may make to economic
stabilization must emerge more or less as a by-product of policies
adopted to minimize the disturbing effects of fluctuations and to
leave the governmental units as free as possible to pursue their ap-
propriate welfare objectives.
Fluctuations ordinarily cause state and local governments to
modify or cut back programs that it would be desirable to carry out.
As Heer suggests, these changes must be assessed on the basis of
what they mean for the standard of services rendered to the com-
munities. The criterion for a successful adaptation of expenditures
to economic fluctuations should be expressed in terms of maintain-
ing some designated (quite possibly secularly rising) standard of
I wish to acknowledge the participation of Anne White in the preparation of
these comments.
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"real" per capita services. The actual dollar outlays involved in
maintaining such standards would then automatically vary at least
with population and prices. Further, as I construe maintaining
standards, outlays would also vary inversely with the level of un-
employment through the impact of the latter on public assistance;
for it is part of the job of maintaining standards to carry through
on a commitment to provide a given "real" amount of general relief
to all persons who qualify on the basis of eligibility rules unchanged
from those prevailing in a prosperity period.
On the revenue side a successful adaptation would make it un-
necessary for the governmental unit to tinker with the rate struc-
ture as a reaction to fluctuations—permitting constant tax rates dur-
ing depression and a minimum of rate increases during inflation. If
initially rates are high enough and the tax structure sufficiently
sensitive to income changes, expenditures for maintaining stand-
ards can be balanced over a whole cycle through a system of multi-
year carryback or carryforward of revenue surpluses from the
prosperity period. This mode of adjustment meets and goes beyond
Heer's stricture that expenditure reduction without offsetting tax
reduction should be avoided if possible.
A maintenance-of-standards policy, then, would produce an auto-
matic decline in revenues at constant tax rates and a semiautomatic
expansion of expenditures as the minimal response to depression.
A degree of built-in flexibility would thus be provided at the state
and local level.
A maintenance-of-standards policy also can serve a more funda-
mental diagnostic purpose. To get some idea of the magnitude of
the problem to which adjustment must be made—that is, to isolate
the effects of fluctuations themselves from the effects of any short-
run policy adjustments to them—it is necessary to work with an
expenditure and revenue policy that can remain invariant with re-
spect to economic fluctuations and that can be readily translated
into quantitative terms. The obvious solution on the revenue side is
an unchanged tax rate. A maintenance-of-standards budget is a
possible solution on the expenditure side—with the budget assumed
here calling for a constant rather than a rising standard of services.
The two devices together would make it possible to estimate an
expenditure-revenue gap associated with any assumed decline
in employment and corresponding fall in gross national product.
They thus provide a useful tool for measuring both the problem
that confronts the state and local governments and their possible
minimal contribution to economic stability.
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A rough indication of the over-all expenditure-revenue gap that
a maintenance-of-standards policy would produce in a forthcoming
period of economic depression can be obtained by means of pro-
jections based on state and local expenditure and revenue data for
recent years. As a supplement to Heer's paper, I want to present
some figures using this type of analysis. The purpose of these esti-
mates is twofold, as already suggested: to obtain some measure of
the magnitude of the problem of adjustment that state and local
governments may have to face, and to develop a measure of a possi-
ble minimum automatic contribution to economic stabilization.
The size of the expenditure-revenue gap will depend, of course,
on the severity of the depression; and the financial problem the gap
presents to state and local governments will be influenced by the
amount of federal aid that becomes available. Recurrenôe of a gap
with anything like the catastrophic proportions of 1929—1933 can
probably be ruled out of consideration. Or, to put it another way,
any such eventuality may be clearly regarded as a failure of federal
policy, justifying emergency measures, and need not be taken into
account by state and local government in planning their finances.
On the other hand, even a successful federal policy for controlling
fluctuations cannot be taken to imply continously full employment
at stable prices, and hence state and local governments must count
on a significant degree of fluctuation both upward and downward.
The current concern about state and local autonomy or independ-
ence implies interest in the extent to which state and local govern-
ments can make their way in a moderately fluctuating economy
with no expansion of federal aid beyond that already built into
the structure of federal-state-local fiscal relations.
Needless to say, no great refinement of estimation underlies the
derivation of these expenditure-revenue figures; they represent a
quick adjustment to extend figures worked out in detail for large
cities to cover all state and governments.1 The procedure was
this: A simplified cycle model indicating hypothetical fluctuations in
gross national product in terms of annual figures was constructed.
The model allows for three years of less than full employment with
unemployment in the lowest year averaging 8 million, or 12 per
cent of the labor force. This results from an assumed man-hour
loss equal to 15 per cent of available man-hours—that is, 15 per
cent of the product of the civilian labor force and the standard
workweek—accounted for in part by an assumed shift to shorter
1Cf.Melvin and Anne White, "Impact of Economic Fluctuations on Municipal
Finance," National Tax Journal, March 1954, p. 17.
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hours for those remaining employed. This probably represents about
the limit of severity which state and local governments can be
expected to plan for. In a depression more serious than this, the
state and local problem and its contribution to economic stabiliza-
tion would probably be swamped in the national emergency. Fairly
stable prices were assumed, with a maximum decline of 5percent.
Combined with other assumptions, this implied a peak-year-to-
trough-year decline of about 10 per cent in gross national product.
In this model, increase on the expenditure side reflects changes in
the cost of continuing a standard of services established during the
last pre-depression year, which is taken to be 1953. Calculations
were made ofi the basis of the per capita standard of service pro-
vided in 1953 at an estimated cost of $29 billion. On this basis, ex-
penditures for maintenance of standards rise through the depres-
sion period, reaching $30.5 billion at the trough—about two years
after the onset of the depression—or $1'/2 billion above the initial
year expenditures. Expenditures then maintain a fairly even level
for the subsequent recovery year, when the reduction in public as-
sistance outlays due to rising employment is just about offset by the
increase in requirements due to rising prices and growing popula-
tion.2
2 Estimates of expenditures—and revenues—for 1953 were obtained by adjust-
ing available 1952 data given in the Bureau of the Census's Summary of Gov-
ernmental Financesin 1952 according to the government-purchase-of-goods-and-
services component of the national income accounts. The 1953 expenditure total
excludes expenditures out of unemployment compensation and other trust funds
but includes contributions of state and local governments to their employee re-
tirement funds, which constitute a charge on the budget. Also excluded is a por-
tion of the actual capital outlay figure. This exclusion is implied by the decision
to measure the impact of depression on the cost of maintaining standards of per
capita services at the pre-depression (1953) level, rather than on the cost of a
secularly rising standard. Insofar as services derived from capital assets are con-
cerned, constant standards are assumed to require a constant ratio of real assets
to population. On the basis of the only data readily available on capital assets
of state and local governments, a reasonable allowance for depreciation and
population growth during 1953 yields a capital outlay requirement of $4.5 billion.
The estimated excess of outlays in 1953 over this figure—which comes to almost
$31,4 billion—is taken to indicate net expansion of capital in relation to popula-
tion; if projected throughout the depression it would imply a continuously rising
ratio of assets to population, and therefore for purposes of estimating constant
standards it is subtracted from the base figure for capital outlays.
The rise in general relief case loads is the most important factor contributing
to the increase in expenditures. There are no data available to measure how
many cases would be added to welfare budgets in a future depression as severe
as that assumed here, since welfare standards have changed greatly. The rise in
case loads underlying the rise in welfare expenditure is derived by linear projec-
tion of a correlation between case loads and unemployment for recent
a the increases in
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In 1953, revenues from state and local governments' owm sources
(excluding revenues of insurance trust funds) are estimated to have
been enough to cover the expenditures of $29 billion included in
the maintenance-of-standards budget. The decline in tax revenues
induced by the drop in gross national product hypothesized in the
model is calculated on the basis of an estimated income elasticity
for the state and local revenue structure of .5.Betweenthe peak
year and the trough year the decline amounts to about $1.3 billion.
It is slightly offset by an increase in federal aid to state and local
governments. On the assumption that legislation governing these
programs in 1952 is continued unchanged throughout the cycle, the
increase in federal aid is about $.2 billion and thus the net decline
in revenue is about $1 billion.8
unemployment and the associated increase in case loads. The public welfare case
loads in the categories of old age assistance and assistance to the blind and dis-
abled are assumed to rise with population growth during the depression years,
but the rise in aid to dependent children is assumed to be predominantly a cycli-
cal reaction. The increase in the final public welfare figure reflects the above
factors offset to some extent by the hypothesized decline in prices, which reduces
the dollar requirement per case load grant.
Expenditure categories in which payrolls absorb a high proportion of outlays,
such as education and police and fire protection, also rise. This rise reflects the
increase in personnel required to maintain standards for a growing population,
and the assumption that state and local governments will maintain constant wage
rates during the depression—neither cutting them nor providing usual
ductivity" increases. Categories in which materials purchased are important—
such as health, sanitation, and highway maintenance—as well as capital outlays,
do decline somewhat as a result of the assumed general decline in prices. The
behavior of interest charges depends on the financial policies pursued. But even
if the entire expenditure-revenue gap is financed by borrowing, the impact on
interest charges is still slight.
The elasticity coefficient of .5 is an average of individual elasticities weighted
by the amounts collected under the respective taxes in the base year. It is as-
sumed for these calculations that this elasticity remains stable over the whole
period. Actually the coefficient would vary somewhat with changes in the level
of income as taxes with high individual elasticities shifted in relative importance
compared with taxes of low elasticity. However, for the present model the varia-
tion in the over-all coefficient would not be great.
It may be noted that for a period as long as that covered by the model, there
may be some distinction between the cyclical and secular responsiveness of tax
yields to income changes. Such a distinction is probably of significance only in
estimating the elasticity of the property tax. Measurement of elasticity is also
complicated by the i,roblem of time lags. No attempt has been made here to
deal with these complexities, arid the elasticities for the individual revenue sources
are based on the findings of H. M. Groves and C. H. as given in
Stability of State and Local Tax Yields" (American Economic Review, March
1952), and on certain theoretical considerations.
Federal aid for nonwelfare purposes. is simply assumed to rise proportionately
with population. On the basis of existing legislation, federal aid for welfare
assistance could be expected to rise proportionately with the number of recipients,
assuming the dollar grant per case remained constant. The fact that the dollar
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For the trough year, then, expenditures are about $1% billion
higher and revenues $1 billion lower than they were in the pre-
depression year, when revenues just balanced the maintenance-of-
standards budget. The total gap, excluding the operations of trust
funds, is $2'/2 billion for the trough year. The model allows for three
years of less than full employment, and the total depression period
gap comes to just about $5 billion.
It should be noted that not all of this $5 billion depression gap
is the result of reactions that can be properly included in the con-
cept of built-in flexibility. Built-in flexibility refers to changes in
revenues and outlays contingent on changes in gross national prod-
uct and other income aggregates; specifically it does not refer to
expansion in expenditures as a result of population growth. Conse-
quently the built-in flexibility gap would be somewhat less than
$5 billion. It would reflect only the cyclical expansion in welfare
case loads and the net decline of revenues, offset by the price level
decline affecting all categories of expenditures.
Two questions can be raised about this gap: One, are the state
and local governments able to finance a $5 billion gap either out of
reserves or by borrowing? Second, assuming that all states and
localities pursue such policies, will their outlays help to stabilize
aggregate demand?
To turn first to the financing of the gap. According to the Bureau
of the Census's Summary of Government Finances, state and local
governments in 1952 held $15 billion in cash and securities, for
which no specific allocation is indicated. Unfortunately I have
nothing to add to Heer's information on the extent to which these
liquid holdings are subject to commitments or minimum working
balances and thereby are restricted from use as a free reserve fund.
But even if something of the order of $5 billion could be made
available to finance the expenditure-revenue gap, there is no reason
to suppose that the distribution among states and localities of this
total would parallel the distribution of the total expenditure-revenue
gap.
If reserves are not available, the alternative is borrowing. Heer
has made it clear that state and local governments have a large
grant per case is assumed to decline, reflecting the f all in consumer• prices, might
imply that federal aid would rise slightly more than in proportion to state and
local expenditures (due to the provision for reducing the proportion paid by the
federal government when the payment per case rises above a certain sum). How-
ever, the price factor in this instance is very small and has been ignored, and
federal aid for assistance is assumed to maintain a constant ratio to state and local
expenditures for welfare assistance programs.
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and unused borrowing capacity and that the numerous institutional
difficulties in the way of expanding debt in depression are probably
not insurmountable. I differ with him, however, on his apparent re-
striction of borrowing to capital outlays. It seems to me that financ-
ing current expenses by a program of short-term borrowing repaid
in a subsequent period of prosperity amounts to essentially the
same thing as financing out of reserves accumulated in previous
prosperity periods—one isa carryback of surplus, the other a
carryforward, and neither requires any permanent increase in debt.
As a matter of fact, the practical difficulties in the way of administer-
ing and maintaining the integrity of a reserve fund program seem
to me more impressive than those raised by a program of depression
short-term borrowing. And insofar as ultimate cost to the taxpayer is
concerned, borrowing is no more expensive than reserve fund ac-
cumulation.
The question of depression financing makes clear the importance
of considering what comes after the depression is over. Financial
difficulties do not necessarily terminate with the return of full
employment. Assuming that the hypothesized three-year depression
were followed by a steady business expansion at stable prices,
figures based on my illustrative model indicate that revenues from
a tax structure with an elasticity of .5 (plus federal aid) would
not quite keep pace with expenditures for maintaining standards.
Thus tax rates would have to be raised to produce the surplus
necessary to replace the drain on reserves or to repay the depression
period addition to debt. If a price inflation were assumed, the costs
of maintaining standards would rise even more rapidly, and the
cumulative deficit over the whole cycle might become very large.
Thus the present financial structure, with constant tax rates, would
not raise adequate funds over the cycle as a whole. The problem
would be more acute for localities—as indeed it was during the post-
war inflation—than for the states, which tend to have more elastic
tax structures.
It is probably worth giving special notice at this point to the
cyclical pattern of expenditures that is implied here, particularly
when depression is followed by some price inflation. After adjust-
ment for the long-term upward trend, expenditures vary essentially
with prices and unemployment. Wages and prices tend to be more
sensitive to upward than to downward pressures; thus price level
declines are not much of an offset to the effects of rising unem-
ployment. On the other hand, price rises as unemployment tapers
off help to produce further expansion of expenditures—especially
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if an inflationary upswing develops. Thus expenditures tend to
rise during both depression and full employment, reaching a mini-
mum point somewhere in the period of recovery.
I have some reservations about Heer's analysis of the demand
effects of expenditure and revenue movements generally—particu-
larly his discussion of stabilization reserves and incentive tax re-
duction. Apparently he considers that if state and local expenditures
remain constant and the structure of tax rates is unchanged, state
and local finance will be neutral in its effects on aggregate demand.
One aspect of this problem is covered in the discussion of David
Lusher's paper in this volume: the need- to specify a bench-mark
by which to measure the impact of automatically induced changes
in revenues (or expenditures) on aggregate income, and the cor-
relative problem of what constitutes a good bench-mark. I do not
believe that Heer's bench-mark, if I have interpreted it correctly, of
constant rates and constant dollar expenditures is the most useful
one. It tends to conceal the significance of induced movements on
the tax side, which implies an asymmetric treatment compared with
the expenditures side.
I would suggest a bench-mark policy of constant expenditures and
constant tax collections. Such a bench-mark is oriented to the ques-
tion: How much more or less are state and local governments con-
tributing (in absolute terms) to aggregate demand than they were
in the last pre-recession year? Then, however the contribution in
the pre-recession year is itself evaluated, a depression-induced ex-
penditure-revenue gap becomes an incremental contribution.
Quantitative assessment of the impact of the expenditure-revenue
gap as developed here requires the usual assumptions about the
spending functions involved in national income models with per-
haps specific attention to the spending propensities of the recipi-
ents of welfare payments and the beneficiaries of tax reduction,
taking into account the offsetting effect of state and local tax
duction on the federal income tax base. Liquidity implications and
non-induced investment effects can certainly be ignored. A thorough-
going analysis would take into account the time lags involved in the
income-spending-income sequence.
The results of such an analysis can be expressed following Lusher
and Musgrave-Miller in terms of the decline in gross national prod-
uct (assuming a given decline in autonomous expenditures) that
would be forestalled by state and local outlays to cover the
expenditure-revenue gap. But a budgetary policy that would elimi-
nate the expenditure-revenue gap also implies a somewhat different
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functional relation between changes in national product and changes
in consumption; thus it becomes quite difficult to estimate how much
decline in gross national product would be forestalled by a policy
which permits, as compared with one which does not permit, the
gap to develop.
Therefore I prefer to express what a maintenance-of-standards
policy would contribute in somewhat different terms—in terms of
the incremental decline it would permit in autonomous expendi-
tures, give a pattern of decline in gross national product of a maxi-
mum of, say, 10 per cent. That is, an incremental expenditure-revenue
gap of $5 billion by states and localities would permit autonomous
expenditures to drop $4 billion farther than otherwise (this decline
might be about 10 per cent of a depression period level of gross pri-
vate domestic investment) without producing a decline in gross na-
tional product of more than the original 10 per cent. In general, in
appraising potential contribution to stabilization it seems to me better
to relate changes in state and local expenditures and revenues to gross
private domestic investment rather than, as Heer does, to gross na-
tional product. In any event, if the relationship is to be to gross
national product, the multiplier cannot be left out.
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